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ABSTRACT 
On the basis of the technical definition of selection developed by George Price (1995), we describe 
two forms of selection that commonly occur at the social level, subset selection and generative 
selection.  Both forms of selection are abstract and general, and therefore also incomplete; both 
leave aside the question of explaining the selection criterion and why entities possess stable traits.  
However, an important difference between the two kinds of selection is that generative selection 
can accommodate an explanation of how new variation is created, while subset selection cannot.  
An evolutionary process involving repeated cycles of generative selection can, in principle, 
continue indefinitely because imperfect replication generates new variation along the way, whereas 
subset selection reduces variation and eventually grinds to a halt.  Even if the two kinds of selection 
are very different, they share a number of features.  First, neither subset selection nor generative 
selection implies improvement: neither kind of selection necessarily leads to efficiency or implies 
systematic outcomes.  Second, both subset selection and generative selection can lead to extremely 
rapid effects in a social population.  Third, in the social domain, both generative selection and 
subset selection involve choice and preference in some way: neither form of selection necessarily 
excludes intentionality.  In concluding the article, we single out a challenge for future research in 
identifying the role of various units of culture in selection processes and the multiple levels at which 
social selection processes take place.   
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The Nature and Units of Social Selection 
Geoffrey M. Hodgson and Thorbjørn Knudsen  
1. Introduction  
In common usage, selection is synonymous with choice, connoting the act of selecting, as in the 
selection of an item from a restaurant menu.1  In contrast, the scientific usage of selection has a very 
precise meaning, referring to a change in the distribution of a population property (a set of traits) 
such as the colour of moths or the size of firms in an industry.  However, as emphasized below, this 
scientific meaning does not necessarily exclude choice. 
Two very different concepts of selection are employed in science, and both are encompassed by 
its general mathematical definition (Price, 1995; Knudsen, 2002, 2004).  One meaning can involve 
the selection of a subset of elements from a set.  Examples include the selection of a subset of 
reindeer that survive a predator‟s attack or the selection of a subset of firms that survive an industry 
shakeout.  Price (1995) termed this subset selection.  Subset selection is very different from the 
concept of generative selection – which was part of Darwin‟s great achievement – where offspring 
are not subsets of parents.2 
The general concept of selection follows from a mathematical definition developed by George 
Price (1995).  It can be described in the following way:  Selection involves an anterior set of 
entities, each interacting with their environment, and somehow being transformed into a posterior 
set, where all members of the posterior set are sufficiently similar to some members of the anterior 
set, and where the resulting frequencies of posterior entities depend upon their properties in the 
environmental context.3   
The concept of selection that follows from Price‟s technical definition is very general and 
includes a number of interesting and complicated cases.  We shall focus on particularly important 
                                                 
1 The authors are very grateful to Guido Bünstorf, Werner Callebaut, Christian Cordes, Peter Corning, J. Stanley 
Metcalfe, Janet Landa, Joel Mokyr, Richard R. Nelson, Peter Richerson, Jack Vromen, Ulrich Witt, and other 
participants of the workshop on “Evolutionary Concepts in Economics and Biology” arranged by the Evolutionary 
Economics Group, at the Max Planck Institute, Jena, 2-4 December 2004. 
2 Nevertheless, we chose the term „generative selection‟, rather than „Darwinian selection‟, because both forms of 
selection are present in Darwin‟s work. 
3 The technical definition of selection is explored at greater length elsewhere (Andersen, 2004; Frank, 1998; Hofbauer 
and Sigmund, 1998; Pepper and Knudsen, 2001; Price, 1995; Knudsen, 2002, 2004; Henrich, 2004) and summarized in 
the Appendix below. 
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objects of selection, such as interactors (e.g. organisms or firms) or replicators (e.g. genes or 
routines).  For expository purposes we define each anterior set to include and exhaust one class of 
entities, such as a species (a class of organisms) or a population of firms (a class of institutions).  
This implies that we only consider the case where members of the anterior set are eliminated 
through extinction.  New entities can appear in the posterior set, but only in consequence of a 
replication process.  Particular entities do not reappear after they have gone extinct. 
Through selection, a set of entities, a population, will gradually adapt in response to a complex of 
environmental factors.  Both conceptually and empirically, the change caused by selection is 
sharply distinguished from such change that happens when information is transferred, in processes 
where an entity develops, or as a result of individual experimentation.  Such transmission and 
innovation effects alter the property of individual entities when the population is held constant.  In 
contrast, selection alters the composition of the population, but holds constant the properties of the 
individual entities.   
There are number of advantages of the general definition of selection presented here.  First, it 
settles the meaning of selection so that much idle speculation can be avoided.  Second, it is stated in 
an abstract and general way that makes no reference to any particular empirical domain, be it 
physical, biological or social.  Third, it encompasses both subset selection and generative selection.   
It should be emphasized, however, that while this general definition of selection involves a 
systematic relationship between the anterior set and the posterior set, the selection outcome is not 
necessarily an improvement, or close to the global optimum.  Consequently, this general conception 
of the selection process is not necessarily systematic in the sense of leading to efficacious outcomes.  
Although successive adaptations to an environment can often be observed at the social level as well 
as in nature, there are cases such a lock-in, path dependence and frequency dependence that confine 
the selection process to a suboptimal track.   
 
 
3. Subset Selection 
Consider the following example of subset selection in nature (Landa et al. 1999).  There is an 
anterior distribution of speed in a population of reindeer.  A wolverine slays a number of the 
reindeer.  In consequence, the distribution of speed in reindeer is transformed into a posterior set.  If 
the slowest die, there is a significant and positive selection for higher average speed in reindeer.  
However, subset selection could as well occur because an avalanche eliminated reindeer at random, 
or perhaps even the fastest reindeer.  A similar argument holds for subset selection on firms and 
other institutions.  Subset selection can alter the value of a population property when some 
properties of firms remain stable (such as the number of hierarchical layers) in a population of 
firms.  For example, business ventures that are eliminated because of bankruptcy are a case of 
subset selection.  This is a very common phenomenon.  At any given time, only a fraction of new 
entrepreneurial start-ups survive (Aldrich, 2004; Katz and Gartner, 1988).   
Subset selection is here defined as: one cycle of environmental interaction and elimination of 
entities in a population, so structured that the environmental interaction causes elimination to be 
differential.  Evolution happens because of repeated cycles of subset selection.  Each cycle of subset 
selection eliminates variation.  In a formal description, subset selection is a contraction mapping.  
Each cycle of subset selection contracts the anterior set, yielding a posterior set with fewer elements 
than the anterior set.  Eventually, after many cycles of subset selection, the anterior set has 
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contracted so it only contains one remaining member of the population – or it may even become an 
empty set.  Subset selection will eventually run dry of variation and come to a halt.  
Selection is always a causal claim.  In the case of subset selection, the causes of differential 
survival must be traced to environmental interaction.  For example, there is a critical difference 
between reindeer being killed by wolverines and by avalanches.  In both cases, the causes of 
differential survival are properly identified, but the outcome is likely to be very different.  Mere 
observations of differential survival are referred to as sorting (Vrba and Gould, 1986).  They can 
obviously be quite misleading.  Unless qualified by identification of the operative selection criteria, 
there is no way of knowing whether observed survival rates reflect selection processes, migration or 
something else.  Notably, selection criteria can operate on different time-scales and thus appear 
more or less systematic – wolverines kill reindeer more frequently than do avalanches and thus 
appear more systematic.  
Surprisingly many population processes in nature and at the social level involve subset selection.  
Molecules, cells, plants, moths, reindeer, and tigers are populations of biological interactors whose 
properties are altered by subset selection.  Hard winters, hot summers, and various natural 
catastrophes commonly eliminate organisms.  Similarly, institutions, social organizations and 
human individuals are populations of social interactors whose properties are altered by subset 
selection.  As previously noted, the elimination of business organisations through bankruptcy is a 
very common example of subset selection at the social level.  Through elimination of entities, 
subset selection also shapes the properties of populations of biological replicators, such as genes, 
and social replicators, such as habits and routines.   
In cases where the selection criterion is located at the physical or biological level, such as 
earthquakes, subset selection does not involve choice and preference.  However, when the selection 
criterion is located at the social level, human choice and preference is always somehow involved, 
even if indirectly.  A common instance of subset selection at the social level is the elimination of 
firms through bankruptcy.  Weak technical efficiency, wanting market orientation, a reputation for 
dishonesty, a lack of institutional support caused by inadequate business models, inefficient 
production processes, unattractive product portfolios, and ineffective internal organization often 
lead to bankruptcy (Aldrich, 1999; McMillan, 2002; Tushman and Anderson, 1986).  In such cases, 
choices and preferences are involved in some way because it is the deliberate choices of managers 
that lead to failure. However, the selection outcome overall may not itself be a direct reflection of 
the discrete decision of a single person or group.4 
Often, the selection criterion operating on firms comprises a complex of environmental factors; it 
becomes a composite weighted measure.  Further complications are introduced by considering the 
environment as endogenous to the selection process.  Powerful (groups of) entities can sometimes 
change the selection rules.  The matter is further complicated because selection of firms is a process 
operating at multiple interdependent levels. Even though such complications introduce both 
multiple, recursive and nested components in the selection criterion (fitness function) – thus 
complicating the unique identification of the causes of a change in a population property – they can 
readily be accommodated in Price‟s formulation (see Appendix).   
                                                 
4 When a selection outcome overall does reflect such a discrete decision, this is sometimes described as „artificial 
selection‟. However, contrary to Commons (1934) and many others, artificial selection is not opposed to Darwinian 
selection (Hodgson, 2002). On the contrary, Darwin (1859) used the concept of artificial selection to illustrate natural 
selection. Commons was also mistaken in his suggestion that if selection is not artificial then it necessarily excludes 
choice and will. His critique of Veblen in this respect was thus misguided. 
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While Price‟s formulation can accommodate a realistic description of subset selection at the level 
of firms, there is a further requirement that firms must possess stable traits.  Any kind of selection 
process operates on stable population properties.  According to Winter (1971), Nelson and Winter 
(1982), Hannan and Freeman (1989) and many others, routinized rules are such stable components.   
Environmental feedback effectively selects among firms with stable properties; some survive 
while others are eliminated through bankruptcy.  In consequence of market feedback, firms go 
bankrupt and exit the population (McMillan, 2002).   As firms exit the population, the average value 
of a population property held by these firms can change.  Should firms with many hierarchical 
layers exit, there is a decrease in the average number of hierarchical layers in the population.  Such 
change in a population property because of differential elimination of firms is a common example 
of subset selection at the social level.  The argument extends to the selection of industries, nation 
states and even entire civilizations. 
There are many cases of subset selection where the members of the anterior set are not eliminated 
through extinction.  These cases raise additional conceptual problems that are not considered in the 
present article.  Neither do we consider subset selection in populations of geological entities or 
artefacts such as stones, pottery, furniture, and books.  While these examples of subset selection are 
encompassed by Price‟s definition of selection, they do not involve interactors or replicators.  The 
consideration of selection processes where members of the anterior set are not eliminated through 
extinction or selection processes on entities that are not replicators or interactors is left for future 
work.   
Subset selection offers an explanation of change, but it is an incomplete explanation.  In one of 
the above examples, a wolverine killed the slowest reindeer, but it could as well have slain the 
fastest.5  Subset selection leaves unexplained the selection criterion that transforms the anterior set 
into a posterior set.  The change in the population property (e.g. speed in reindeer) is left 
unexplained.  
The above examples highlight a number of important points.  First, many population processes in 
nature and at the social level involve subset selection where a population property is changed by a 
selection criterion removing members of a population.  Second, subset selection leaves aside the 
question of explaining the selection criterion and the mechanisms of selection.  The elimination and 
extinction of reindeer or firms must be accounted for by additional specific mechanisms.  Third, 
subset selection does not imply improvement.  As noted above, subset selection is formally a 
contraction mapping.  Additional requirements are needed to ensure that the contraction of an initial 
anterior set containing entities with a distribution of a population property eliminates all but the 
entity with the globally maximum value of the population property (e.g. the fastest reindeer).  
Selection would occur even if the wolverine killed the swiftest reindeer or a dictator eliminated the 
most efficient firms.  Fourth, subset selection can lead to extremely rapid effects in a social 
population.  A distribution of firms could be changed within days.   
The example also assumed some variation in reindeer speed even though each cycle of subset 
selection removes variation.  Subset selection decouples the generation of new variation from the 
process of selection and leaves unexplained the variation in the anterior set.  In the absence of any 
additional processes to replenish lost variation, subset selection will eventually come to a halt or can 
                                                 
5 Landa et al. (1999) report from empirical observation that wolverines actually tend to kill less agile reindeer and 
sheep. 
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even lead to the extinction of a population.  The example further assumed that the population 
property in question was stable, that reindeer could not alter their (maximum) speed.   
Similar additional assumptions regarding the selection criterion, the generation of new variation 
and a stable population property justified the example of subset selection on a population of firms.  
Subset selection assumes a selection criterion that alters the distribution of a population property, it 
assumes variation in this property, and it assumes that the property in question is stable.  Subset 
selection offers no place for particular explanations of these assumptions.  It is an incomplete 
explanation.   
The explanatory incompleteness of subset selection can be viewed as a price paid for its 
generality.  Subset selection can be invoked as an explanation of change in all kinds of distributions 
that are shaped by a selection criterion, including the selection of interactors (e.g. biological 
organisms and social institutions) and replicators (e.g. habits, routines, and folkways), the kind of 
entities which are the primary focus of the present article.   
 
 
4. Generative Selection 
In generative selection, the change in a population property, such as moth colour, happens because 
the interaction of moths with their environment gives rise to differential replication.  Moths with 
better camouflage are less likely to be eaten by predators and therefore, on average, leave more 
offspring carrying their genes.  In this way, dark moths become more frequent in polluted areas.  
When smokeless zones are introduced so trees‟ hues become lighter, the colour of the moth 
population can again become lighter in response.   
Generative selection is here defined as: one cycle of replication, variation and environmental 
interaction so structured that the replication process causes new variation (i.e. new, emergent 
varieties alter the distribution of the population property) and the environmental interaction causes 
replication to be differential.6  Evolution happens because of repeated cycles of generative 
selection.  Notably, the generation of new variation is integral to generative selection.   New 
variation is generated because replication is never perfect and because replication involves 
recombination of existing variants.   
Consider generative selection on reindeer.  There is an anterior distribution of speed in reindeer. 
Environmental interaction transforms the anterior distribution of speed into an intermediate set 
(some reindeer die, some are less attractive mating partners), which is then transformed into a new 
posterior set by replication.  There is replacement of entities because of death and replication.  
Replication involves genetic inheritance between parent and offspring.7  More speedy reindeer on 
average have more speedy offspring.  The faster mating partners have a higher survival rate and 
therefore replicate more, resulting in a significant increase of fast reindeer in the posterior set.  
                                                 
6 This definition of generative selection is based on Hull et al. (2001).  Generative selection is a particularly important 
member of the set of distinctive selection processes encompassed by Price‟s (1995) definition, but he does not use the 
term. 
7 The definitions of selection, replication and interaction employed here do not in principle exclude the „Lamarckian‟ 
possibility of the inheritance of acquired characters. Indeed, Darwin himself believed such „Lamarckian‟ inheritance 
existed. We critically appraise the applicability of the „Lamarckian‟ label to socio-economic evolution elsewhere 
(Hodgson and Knudsen, forthcoming). 
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There is positive selection of reindeer with high speed and a complementary selection for genes 
with high speed.8  However, generative selection could as well occur because a complex of factors 
influenced the environmental interaction of reindeer.  Attention to unusual environmental factors 
and care for offspring could influence replication to a larger extent than the ability to run at fast 
pace.   
As in the case of subset selection, generative selection leaves aside the question of explaining the 
selection criterion and the existence of a stable population property.  The nature of the feedback 
from environmental interaction to replication must be accounted for by additional specific 
mechanisms, and so must the stability of the population property that we are studying (unless the 
stability comes from genetic endowment).   
However, in contrast to subset selection, generative selection can accommodate an explanation of 
how new variation is created.  Because of replication error (mutation) and genetic recombination, 
the offspring of reindeer can have new properties that differ from those possessed by their parents.  
More generally, whenever replication processes produce imperfect copies, generative selection 
generates new variation.9   
Generative selection applies to replicating populations in which continuity is secured by the 
transfer of information (e.g. the transfer of units of culture or genetic inheritance), whereas subset 
selection applies to populations in which continuity is secured by enduring identity among a subset 
of entities.  In generative selection, each instance of replication creates new variation because of 
imperfect replication and recombination.  In subset selection, additional assumptions and 
explanations must be invoked in order to explain why new variation is generated as required to 
continue the evolutionary process.  A third stage of processes is needed to replenish lost variation 
(Foster and Metcalfe 2001).  For this reason, systems in which selection processes have remarkable 
endurance are likely to involve replication (Maynard Smith and Szathmáry 1999).   
 
4.1. Generative Selection at Multiple Levels in the Social Domain? 
Generative selection is a general principle relating interaction to replication such that new variation 
is generated in the process of replication.  An evolutionary process involving repeated cycles of 
generative selection can, in principle, continue indefinitely because imperfect replication generates 
new variation along the way, whereas subset selection removes variation and eventually grinds to a 
halt.  Because of the remarkable endurance of some forms of culture, it is unlikely that they have 
been sustained by subset selection.  We therefore expect that generative selection sustains some 
evolutionary processes in the social domain.   
Possibly, generative selection is present at multiple interdependent levels in the social domain.  In 
order to address this important issue, a definition of the two basic components of generative 
selection, replication and interaction must be provided.  Identification of a hierarchy of social 
                                                 
8 The distinction between selection of and selection for is developed by Sober (1984) and others. Note that it involves a 
distinction between phenotype (of) and genotype (for), but this distinction is not itself expressed within the Price 
definition of selection. 
9 There are two broad additional sources of new variation, drift and environmental changes.  Drift is differential 
replication without environmental interaction.  When drift occurs, there is generation of new variation that can fuel 
subsequent selection processes.  Environmental changes can also introduce new variation in a number of ways.  For 
example, environmental changes can alter replicators (e.g. radioactive radiation causing mutations) or influence 
replication processes so new variation is introduced (e.g. by altering ecological niches).   
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organization at which selection processes occur requires that we single out a social interactor at 
each level (Brandon, 1998, 1999; Hull, 1988, 2001).  That is, we must provide a definition of a 
social interactor and its corresponding replicator if we wish to succeed in identifying a possible 
hierarchy of generative selection processes in the social domain (or rejecting such a claim).  In 
order to get a firmer conceptual grip on the identification of generative selection processes, we must 
understand the nature of its two basic components, replication and interaction.   
The present section therefore begins by defining replication and interaction.  It then continues to 
briefly reiterate what we presently know about units of culture that are social replicators and 
interactors.  Indeed, very little is presently well-defined about the empirical status of social 
replicators and interactors, and even less is established about the multiple levels at which social 
selection processes might occur.  In consequence, we articulate a challenge for future research in 
identifying a hierarchy of multiple levels of selection in the social domain. 
 
4.1.1.  Replication and Interaction  
Replication is a process involving a source and a copy with the following features (Sterelny et al. 
1996; Godfrey-Smith, 2000; Sperber, 2000; Aunger, 2002): (1) causation: the source must be 
causally involved in the production of the copy, at least in the sense that without the source the 
particular copy would not be created, (2) similarity: the copy must possess the capacity to replicate 
and be like its source in other relevant respects, and (3) inheritance: the process that generates the 
copy must obtain the information that makes the copy similar to its source from that same source.  
Note that replication is generally imperfect – there is similarity but not identity between source 
and copy,– and it can therefore generate new variation.  Also note that, according to criterion (2), 
the word “copy” is used merely to describe similarity between members of the anterior and 
posterior set in a selection process.  One should not mistakenly infer that a literal copying process is 
necessarily involved where new entities are (imperfectly) read off of a template or mould.  
According to criterion (1), the source is causally involved in producing a copy, but the source does 
not necessarily function as a template.  The source could have a minimal role in triggering a 
construction process leading to a similar entity.  For example, it is possible to replicate the habit of 
using chopsticks in a number of ways, e.g. instruction by a chopstick teacher, imitation of a 
chopstick user, or reconstruction after seeing a movie featuring a chopstick feast. 
Interaction is also a process.  It concerns the relationship between an entity and an environment 
that brings about differential replication.  The entity in question must interact with its environment 
as a cohesive whole (Hull, 1988, 2001).  Many cohesive wholes exist in nature, but only a few of 
them count as interactors in a selection process.  According to Hull (1988, 2001) chromosomes, 
gametes, organisms, and possibly populations and species interact as cohesive wholes with their 
environment in a way that brings about differential replication, i.e., some structures become more 
common, some more rare.   
Just as genes require very strong connections with organisms in order to bring about differential 
replication, so too do stable cultural components require very strong connections with human 
individuals and social organizations.  Units of culture (e.g. routines) must be strongly connected 
with their carriers (e.g. firms) for differential replication to occur.  In addition, cultural entities must 
interact as cohesive wholes with their environment in a way that brings about differential 
replication.  However, this interpretation depends critically on the understanding of terms such as 
„cohesive‟ and „strong‟.  At this point it is necessary to add some precision to the definition of an 
interactor.  The term „cohesive whole‟ indicates that its components stick together and remain 
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united.  We interpret this to mean that all the components depend critically on the survival of the 
whole, and that to some degree the components depend on the survival of each other. 
If an entity is an interactor, then it must satisfy all of the following minimal conditions (Hodgson 
and Knudsen, 2004).  For each interactor there is a corresponding non-empty „component‟ set of 
replicators, such that the following conditions apply: (1) shared dependence of component 
replicators: if the interactor perishes, then all its component replicators are also likely to perish, (2) 
shared organisation of components: every component replicator is hosted by its interactor and 
principally interacts with the outside world through the interactor, (3) relative independence of non-
component replicators: the interactor and any non-component replicator are independent in the 
sense that the survival of one does not largely depend on the survival of the other, and (4) property-
dependent replication: the properties of an interactor determines the expected number of successor 
replicators within a given environment.  
Interactors and replicators are particularly important objects of selection, both in nature and at the 
social level.  In nature, genes are paradigm examples of replicators and organisms of interactors.  
However, according to the hierarchical perspective on selection (Lewontin, 1970), which is widely 
accepted today, there is selection at multiple interdependent levels, including cells, organisms, 
groups, populations, species, and ecological communities.  Any of these levels of biological 
organization count as interactors (Brandon, 1998, 1999; Hull, 1988, 2001) because entities at each 
of these levels interact as cohesive wholes with their environment in a way that brings about 
differential replication, i.e., some structures become more common, some more rare.  Whereas 
interactors are present at each level of biological organization, only a few entities have evolved to 
fulfil a specialised function as a replicator.  The gene remains the paradigm example.  In 
consequence, interactors at multiple levels may correspond to entities at lower levels that both fulfil 
the role of being interactors and replicators.   
 
4.1.2.  Social Replicators and Interactors 
Little is known about interactors and replicators at the social level.  There is an emerging 
consensus that habits are fundamental, individual-level replicators whereas routines count as 
organization level replicators.  Habits and routines are persistent containers of encoded instructions 
for behaviour or thought.  When this information is reliably passed on, habits and routines can 
function as replicators (Hodgson, 2001, 2003; Hodgson and Knudsen, 2004; Knudsen, 2001, 2002, 
2005; Metcalfe, 1998; Winter and Szulanski, 2001).  A very broad empirical literature supports the 
view that habits and routines have degrees of persistence and copying fidelity that warrant their 
status as replicating repositories of knowledge and custom (Hodgson, 2005; Knudsen, 2005).   
For example, routines and folkways of families and religious communities often emerge in new 
families and religious communities (Fischer, 1989).  In this case, the interaction of cultural groups 
can cause differential replication of routines.  Also the interaction of firms with a particular 
environment (e.g. other firms in an industry) is commonly viewed as the cause of differential 
replication of routines, at least in the minimal sense that stable firm-specific traits underlie 
differential expansion and contraction of firms (Metcalfe, 1998; Metcalfe and Gibbons, 1995; 
Nelson and Winter, 1982).  Different mechanisms of replication are involved when a central unit 
(Headquarters) uses a template to produce a large number of copies of an outlet that delivers a 
service or produces a product (Winter and Szulanski, 2001).  In this case, the interaction of 
Headquarters with its competitors leads to differential replication of the template.  Apparently, 
social organizations can function as interactors that replicate routines in a number of ways. 
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Our understanding in these terms about replicators and interactors in the social domain is 
presently rather incomplete.  Little attention has been directed towards the obvious requirement in 
generative selection of defining corresponding pairs of replicators and interactors.  Contributors to 
memetics (Dawkins, 1976; Blackmore, 1999; Aunger, 2002) and students of cultural evolution 
(Boyd and Richerson, 1985; Durham, 1991) have primarily focussed on the identification of 
replicators, while downplaying the need to firmly establish correspondence between replicator and 
interactor.   
Hodgson and Knudsen (2004) made a case for regarding firms and similarly cohesive institutions 
as interactors that correspond to replicating routines.  However, this is only a first step towards a 
more systematic identification of a hierarchy of interactors and replicators in the social domain.  
While the identification of interactors and replicators is arguably required for the study of 
generative selection processes, little is known about the identity of the entities that count as 
corresponding interactors and replicators in a hierarchy of social organization.  Possibly, habits and 
routines are replicators that give rise to the remarkable persistence of individual and organizational 
behaviour that have been reported in recent empirical studies (Cohen and Bacdyan, 1994; Wood 
and Quinn, 2004).  However, little is known about the different kinds of selection processes that 
shape the distribution of replicating habits and routines. 
In summary, replication and interaction are critical because they are mechanisms required to 
produce generative selection.  Both human individuals and social organizations are social level 
interactors.  The social interaction of human individuals causes differential replication of units of 
culture such as habits.  Families, religious groups, firms and other social groups are higher-level 
interactors.  The interaction of social organizations causes differential replication of higher-level 
units of culture such as routines.  Possibly, cultural units such as folkways, customs, conventions, 
and institutions replicate.  Also technologies and ideas might replicate.  A challenge before us is to 
identify the role of various units of culture in selection processes and the multiple levels at which 
social selection processes take place.  We should aim to outline the different kinds of selection 
processes that are present at each level and the way they are related.  To begin addressing this issue, 
the present article offers a general definition of selection and two sharp concepts of selection that 




Aldrich, Howard E. (1999) Organizations Evolving (London: Sage Publications).  
Aldrich, Howard E. (2004) „Entrepreneurship‟, in Neil Smelser and Richard Swedberg (eds),  
Handbook of Economic Sociology (Princeton University Press).  
Andersen, Esben Sloth (2004) „Population Thinking, Price‟s Equation and the Analysis of 
Economic Evolution‟, Evolutionary and Institutional Economics Review, 2004, 1(1), November, 
pp. 127-48. 
Aunger, Robert (2002) The Electric Meme: A New Theory of How We Think (New York: Free 
Press). 
Blackmore, Susan (1999) The Meme Machine (Oxford: Oxford University Press). 
Boyd, Robert and Richerson, Peter J. (1985) Culture and the Evolutionary Process (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press). 
Brandon, Robert N. (1998) „The Levels of Selection: A Hierarchy of Interactors‟, in Hull, D. L. and 
Ruse, M. (eds) (1998) The Philosophy of Biology (Oxford: Oxford University Press), pp. 176-
197. 
Brandon, Robert N. (1999) „The Units of Selection Revisited: The Modules of Selection‟, Biology 
and Philosophy, 14, pp. 167-180. 
Cohen, Michael D. and Bacdayan, Paul (1994) „Organizational Routines are Stored as Procedural 
Memory – Evidence from a Laboratory Study‟, Organization Science, 5(4), November, pp. 554-
68.  
Commons, John R. (1934) Institutional Economics – Its Place in Political Economy (New York: 
Macmillan). 
Darwin, Charles R. (1859) On the Origin of Species by Means of Natural Selection, or the 
Preservation of Favoured Races in the Struggle for Life (London: Murray). 
Dawkins, Richard (1976) The Selfish Gene, (Oxford: Oxford University Press). 
Durham, William H. (1991) Coevolution. Genes, Culture and Human Diversity (Stanford, CA: 
Stanford University Press). 
Fischer, David Hackett (1989) Albions Seed. Four Brittan Folkways in America (New York and 
Oxford: Oxford University Press).  
Foster, J. and Metcalfe, J. S. (2001) Frontiers of Evolutionary Economics (Cheltenham: Elgar). 
Frank, Steven A. (1997) „Optimal Parameters for Variation and Selection in Learning and 
Development‟, Journal of Theoretical Biology, 194, pp. 31-29. 
Frank, Steven A. (1998) Foundations of Social Evolution (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University 
Press).  
Godfrey-Smith, Peter (2000) „The Replicator in Retrospect‟, Biology and Philosophy, 15, pp. 403-
23. 
Hannan, Michael T., Freeman John (1989) Organizational Ecology (Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press). 
 12 
Henrich, Joseph (2004) „Cultural Group Selection, Coevolutionary Processes and Large-Scale 
Cooperation‟, Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 53(1), February, pp. 3-35. 
Hodgson, Geoffrey M. (2001) „Is Social Evolution Lamarckian or Darwinian?‟ in Laurent, John and 
Nightingale, John (eds) (2001) Darwinism and Evolutionary Economics (Cheltenham: Edward 
Elgar), pp. 87-118. 
Hodgson, Geoffrey M. (2002) „Darwinism in Economics: From Analogy to Ontology‟, Journal of 
Evolutionary Economics, 12(2), June, pp. 259-81. 
Hodgson, Geoffrey M. (2003) „The Mystery of the Routine: The Darwinian Destiny of An 
Evolutionary Theory of Economic Change‟, Revue Économique, 54(2), Mars, pp. 355-84. 
Hodgson, Geoffrey M., Knudsen, Thorbjørn (2004) „The Firm as an Interactor: Firms as Vehicles 
for Habits and Routines‟, Journal of Evolutionary Economics, 14(3), pp. 281-307. 
Hodgson, Geoffrey M. and Knudsen, Thorbjørn (forthcoming) „Dismantling Lamarckism: Why 
Descriptions of Socio-Economic Evolution as Lamarckian are Misleading‟, Journal of 
Evolutionary Economics (forthcoming). 
Hofbauer, Josef, Sigmund, Karl (1998) Evolutionary Games and Population Dynamics (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press). 
Hull, David L. (1988) Science as a Process: An Evolutionary Account of the Social and Conceptual 
Development of Science (Chicago: University of Chicago Press). 
Hull, David L. (2001) Science and Selection. Essays on Biological Evolution and the Philosophy of 
Science (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press). 
Hull, David L., Langman, Rodney E., and Glenn, Sigrid S. (2001) „A General Account of Selection: 
Biology, Immunology and Behavior‟, Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 24(3), pp. 511–28. 
Katz, Jerome A., Gartner, William B. (1988) „Properties of emerging organizations‟, Academy of 
Management Review, 13, pp. 429-441. 
Knudsen, T. (2001) „Nesting Lamarckism within Darwinian Explanations: Necessity in Economics 
and Possibility in Biology?‟, in J. Laurent and J. Nightingale (eds.) Darwinism and Evolutionary 
Economics, pp. 121-159 (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar). 
Knudsen, Thorbjørn (2002) „Economic Selection Theory‟, Journal of Evolutionary Economics, 12, 
pp. 443-470. 
Knudsen, Thorbjørn (2004) „General Selection Theory and Economic Evolution: The Price 
Equation and the Replicator/Interactor Distinction‟, Journal of Economic Methodology, 11(2), 
June, pp. 147-73. 
Knudsen, Thorbjørn (2006) „Organizational Routines in Evolutionary Theory‟, in Becker, Markus 
(ed.) The Handbook of Organizational Routines (forthcoming).  
Landa, A. Gudvangen, K., Swenson, J.E., Roskaft, E. (1999) „Factors Associated with Wolverine 
Gulo gulo Predation on Domestic Sheep‟, The Journal of Applied Ecology, 36(6), pp. 963-973 
Lewontin, Richard (1970) „The Units of Selection‟, Annual Review of Ecology and Systematics 1, 
pp. 1–17. 
Maynard Smith, John and Szathmáry, Eors (1999) The Origins of Life: From the Birth of Life to the 
Origin of Language (Oxford: Oxford University Press). 
 13 
McMillan, John (2002) Reinventing the Bazaar. A Natural History of Markets (New York and 
London: W.W. Norton and Company). 
Metcalfe, J. Stanley (1998) Evolutionary Economics and Creative Destruction. The Graz 
Schumpeter Lectures (London: Routledge). 
Metcalfe, J.S. and Gibbons, M. (1995). Technological Variety and the Process of Competition 
(Reprinted from Economie Appliqué, XXXIX, 1986). In Hodgson, G.M. (ed.): Economics and 
Biology. Aldershot: Edward Elgar, 428-455. 
Nelson, Richard R., Winter, Sidney G. (1982) An Evolutionary Theory of Economic Change 
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press). 
Pepper, John W., Knudsen, Thorbjørn (2001) „Selection Without Multiple Replicators?‟, 
Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 24(3): p. 550. 
Price, George R. (1995) „The Nature of Selection‟, Journal of Theoretical Biology, 175(3), pp. 389-
396. 
Sober, Elliott (1984) The Nature of Selection: Evolutionary Theory in Philosophical Focus 
(Cambridge, MA; MIT Press). 
Sperber, Dan (2000) „An Objection to the Memetic Approach to Culture‟, in Aunger, Robert (ed.) 
(2000) Darwinizing Culture: The Status of Memetics as a Science (Oxford and New York: 
Oxford University Press), pp. 162-73. 
Sterelny, Kim, Smith, Kelly C. and Dickison, Michael (1996) „The Extended Replicator‟, Biology 
and Philosophy, 11, pp. 377-403. 
Szathmáry, Eörs, Maynard Smith, John (1997) „From Replicators to Reproducers: the First Major 
Transitions Leading to Life‟, Journal of Theoretical Biology, 187(4), pp. 555-571. 
Tushman, M.L. and Anderson, P. (1986): Technological Discontinuities and Organizational 
Environments, Administrative Science Quarterly, 31, 439-465. 
Vrba, E.S. and Gould, S.J. (1986) „The Hierarchical Expansion of Sorting and Selection: Sorting 
and Selection Cannot be Equated‟, Paleobiology, 12, pp. 217-228. 
Winter, Sidney G. (1971) „Satisficing, Selection, and The Innovating Remnant‟, The Quarterly 
Journal of Economics, 85(2), pp. 237-261. 
Winter, Sidney G., Szulanski, Gabriel (2001) „Replication as Strategy‟, Organization Science, 
12(6), pp. 730-743. 
Wood, Wendy, Quinn, Jeffrey M. (2004) The Power of Repetition in Daily Life: Habits and 
Intentions Guide Action (Durham, N.C.: Unpublished manuscript, Duke University). 
 14 
Appendix: Price’s (1995) Definition of Selection 
 
According to Price (1995), selection is the act or process of producing a corresponding set. Given a 
set P containing ωi amounts of I distinct elements pi, which have the properties xi, Price (1995) 
defines a corresponding set as follows: 
 
We will say that a set P’ is a corresponding set to a set P if there exists a one-to-one 
correspondence such that, for each member pi of P, there is a corresponding member 
pi’ of P’ which (if not empty) is composed partly or wholly of the same material as pi, 
or has been derived directly from pi, or contains one or more replicas of pi or some 
part of pi or has some other special close relation to pi. (Price, 1995: 392).  
 
Using this definition of a corresponding set, Price (1995: 392) defines selection as: „Selection on a 
set P in relation to a property x is the act or process of producing a corresponding set P’ in a way 
such that the amounts ωi’ (or some function of them such as the ratios ωi’ / ωi) are non-randomly 
related to the corresponding xi values.‟ 
 
The terminology introduced by Price (1995) yields a useful statistical definition of selection.  Let P 
be a set containing ωi amounts of I distinct elements which have the properties xi. A transformation 
P → P’ (possibly the identity transformation) results in a second set P’. The set P’ contains ωi’ 
amounts of I distinct elements with properties xi’. The transformation P → P’ is termed a selection 
process that gives rise to the effect X → X’ in a population property X related to property x of the 
individual set members. This effect X → X’ can be calculated as the change in the average value 
(Price, 1995; Frank, 1997):  
 
∆X = X’- X =  ∑ωi’ xi’ - ∑ωi xi  e∆X= Cov(ei, xi) + E(ei ∆xi),   ωi’= ωi ei/e, 
 
where ei is the fitness of element i in the set P and e is average fitness of the set P.  Selection is 
present whenever Cov(ei, xi) differs significantly from zero.  By contrast, a transmission effect is 
present whenever E(ei ∆xi) differs significantly from zero.  In social populations, a transmission 
effect can be referred to as an individual-level exploration or innovation effect.  A selection or a 
transmission effect refers to a change in the first moment of the trait distribution, i.e., selection is a 
change in the average trait according to the population in question. The Price Equation thus 
provides a useful solution to the definition and empirical verification of possible selection effects in 
a population of interest.  As the reader can verify, it is straightforward to recursively expand the 
above expression to include multiple hierarchical layers of selection (use the expectation term for 
expansion).  A further (not too challenging) issue concerns the expansion of the Price Equation to 
encompass selection on higher moments than the first.   
